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During the first half of the twentieth century, southern black children attended 
public schools that received fewer resources per pupil than public schools 
attended by white children. The schools were racially “separate” but were not 
“equal.”  This chapter will demonstrate that racial inequality in  school re- 
sources led to racial differences in educational outcomes: school attendance, 
literacy rates, and standardized test scores. Had the equal part of  the separate- 
but-equal doctrine been adhered to, racial differences in educational outcomes 
would have been smaller. But “equal” schools were not enough to compensate 
for various aspects of  family background that hindered the average educa- 
tional achievement of black children. 
5.1  The Moral Dilemma of  Separate-but-Equal 
In 1890 the Louisiana state legislature passed the Separate Car Act requir- 
ing “equal, but separate” accommodations for blacks and whites travelling 
within the state on all passenger railways, except for streetcars. Violations, a 
misdemeanor, were punishable by  a maximum fine of $25 or twenty days in 
jail. In 1891 a “Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Sepa- 
rate Car Law” was formed in New Orleans, under the general direction of 
Louis Martinet,  a prominent black lawyer and  doctor. The committee ar- 
ranged a test case in 1892. Daniel Desdunes, a black man who had purchased 
a first-class ticket on the Louisiana and Nashville Railroad, was arrested on 
February 24 after sitting in a whites-only car bound from New  Orleans to 
Mobile, Alabama. The out-of-state destination was chosen deliberately. The 
Committee rested its case on the belief that the Separate Car Act, because it 
appeared to apply to interstate travel, violated the interstate commerce clause 
of the U.S. Constitution. The case never came to trial. On May 25 the Loui- 
siana Supreme Court decided (in the unrelated case of Abbatt v. Hicks)  that 
the Separate Car Act did not apply to interstate passengers. 
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A second test case was then arranged involving travel within the state. 
Homer Plessy was arrested on June 7,’ upon insisting he be allowed to board 
a whites-only car of the East Louisiana Railway Company, which was bound 
from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. At Plessy’s arraignment in New 
Orleans, Judge John Ferguson rejected the arguments of James Walker, Ples- 
sy’s lawyer. Walker asserted that the Separate Car Act, amongst other flaws, 
“establishe[d] an invidious distinction . . .  based on race which . . . abridges 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and the rights 
secured by the XIII” and XIV” amendments to the Federal Constitution” (Lof- 
gren 1987,48-49).  Walker then petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court, and 
District Attorney Lionel Adam responded on behalf of Judge Ferguson. In 
December the state court handed down its ruling: the Separate Car Act did not 
violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Plessy’s trial could pro- 
ceed. 
The stage shifted next to the U.S. Supreme Court. In January 1893 Walker 
filed a brief citing “manifest error” in the Louisiana proceedings. By perpetu- 
ating a racial distinction derived from slavery, the Separate Car Act violated 
the Thirteenth Amendment. Because railways could simply refuse to carry 
noncomplying passengers, and train officials were exempted from suits for 
damages from refusal to carry, Walker argued that the Act violated the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The brief 
also challenged Louisiana’s claim that the Act was a valid expression of police 
power. Rather, the Act was “not in the interest of  public order, peace, and 
comfort,” but was “manifestly directed against citizens of  the colored race” 
with the purpose “to assort and classify all passengers . . . according to race, 
and to make the rights and privileges of all cities of the United States depen- 
dent on said classification”  (1987,48). 
After a long delay, the Supreme Court reached a verdict in May 1896. Writ- 
ing  for  the  majority  was  Justice Henry  Billings  Brown.  Derided by  one 
scholar as a “compound of  bad  logic, bad history, bad  sociology, and bad 
constitutional law” (Harris  1960, 101), Brown’s opinion rejected Walker’s 
brief. “Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts,” Brown averred, 
“and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating . . . difficulties” 
(Lofgren 1987, 178). Brown cited several pre-Plessy cases upholding racial 
segregation in  the public schools to establish the ‘‘reasonableness’’ of  the 
Separate Car Act. The lone dissenter was Justice John Marshall Harlan who, 
consistent with his earlier dissents in civil rights cases, sharply criticized the 
Louisiana law and Brown’s opinion. 
The import of Plessy was to establish firmly that “separate-but-equal was 
unambiguously a part of the law of the Constitution” (1987, 207).2  In the case 
of public education, the legal interpretation of separate was relatively straight- 
forward. Every exconfederate state, along with Missouri, Maryland and the 
District of Columbia, compelled separate schools by constitutional  fiat or stat- 
utory a~thority.~  Children who fit  the legal definition of  “Negro” were re- 
quired to attend the schools for their race-which  is not to say that various 70  Chapter Five  - 
legal definitions of  Negro were without controversy. De jure segregation in 
education frequently extended beyond classroom walls, for example, to the 
race of school personnel. Perhaps the height of  absurdity was reached when 
Florida school law required that “school textbooks used by one race were to 
be stored separately from those used by the other race” (1987,202). 
The meaning of “equal” was less clear-cut. An early definition was pro- 
vided by the U.S.  Supreme Court in its 1899 decision, Cumming v.  Richmond 
County, Georgi~.~  Prior to 1897 the Richmond County school board had op- 
erated a black public high school in Augusta, Georgia. When faced with rap- 
idly growing demand for the county’s black elementary schools, the board 
closed the high school, ostensibly to shift funds to the elementary schools. 
Justice Harlan ruled in favor of the school board; inexplicably so, to many 
scholars, in light of his dissent in Plessy and his opinions in other nineteenth 
century civil rights cases. It is possible to rationalize Harlan’s opinion by ap- 
pealing to what one legal scholar has called “the defense of  compensating 
inequalities” (Tushnet  1987, 24). The needs of  the many younger children 
outweighed the needs of the few older black children who wished to go to a 
public high sch001.~  But the Court was reluctant to interfere with “the man- 
agement of  [public] schools . . .  except in the case of  a clear and unmistak- 
able disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land” (1987, 23). 
Further, a plaintiff would have to show that a school board had acted out of 
“hostility to the colored population because of  their race,” which, Harlan 
judged, was not the intent of the Richmond school board (ibid.). While the 
import of  Cumming was  perhaps less extreme than  a literal interpretation 
would suggest, it  was  far  from negligible.6 Where  they  existed,  schools 
for blacks had to be separate, but their mere existence was sometimes precar- 
ious. 
From a legal point of view the defense of compensating inequalities would 
seem to have been rendered unavailable by  the Supreme Court’s 1914 deci- 
sion, McCabe  v. Atchinson,  Topeka, and Sante  Fe  Railroad.  Oklahoma’s 
separate car statute explicitly allowed railways to deny sleeping or dining cars 
to black travellers, on the grounds that the demand was too small to justify the 
costs. If the railway had to incur the cost of providing separate cars, it would 
have to reduce its services elsewhere to all passengers, including whites. In 
rejecting Oklahoma’s argument the Supreme Court established the “personal 
rights” doctrine: individuals were entitled to equal protection under the law of 
the land. Economic considerations might figure in the decision to provide a 
particular type of  service, but once the service was  provided, “substantial 
equality of  treatment of persons . . . under like facilities cannot be refused” 
(Tushnet 1987, 24).’ When applied to public education, McCabe apparently 
undercut the defense proferred in Cumming. If a black student wished to enroll 
in high school, the school board could not argue that it provided a vocational 
school instead or that the elementary schools were more important. In effect, 
McCabe compelled equal facilities to be provided “for both races, no matter 
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McCabe notwithstanding, the law evolved in a way to make loopholes read- 
ily available and challenges to violations difficult. Mississippi’s school code 
of  1930 specified that any separate school could be discontinued if the average 
monthly attendance was less than five pupils. West Virginia law required a 
minimum of ten pupils, except if “circumstances render[ed] it practicable to 
establish a separate school for a smaller number” (1940, 93-95).  Problems 
might be resolved by permitting children to enroll in a nearby district, at the 
home district’s expense. But what if  the schools were so bad or inaccessible 
that fewer than five or ten pupils attended? Worse, the fact that a black child 
might have to travel a much longer distance to get to school (without the ben- 
efit of  a school bus) would not have necessarily violated the separate-but- 
equal doctrine as it was commonly understood, unless the distance was “un- 
reasonable” or the trip was physically dangerous (Risen 1935,73). 
Separate-but-nonexistent schools €or blacks was  a big  issue at  the  high 
school level and beyond. Black teenagers wishing to attend a high  school 
might have to travel or move to a nearby city. The gross absence of profes- 
sional or postgraduate training for blacks in the South led to a celebrated set 
of  cases brought by  the NAACP,  such as Gaines v. Missouri in  1939. In 
Gaines the Supreme Court outlawed the widespread use of  state scholarships 
for black students to attend universities outside the South, what had been the 
solution for higher education analogous to the practice of permitting elemen- 
tary enrollments in nearby districts. Gaines also provided for three remedies 
when blacks sought to be enrolled in state facilities: the state could close down 
the white school, it could integrate, or it could establish a separate black 
school. But if it chose the third course, the school had to have substantially 
equivalent facilities, and the court made it clear that makeshift arrangements 
would violate the separate-but-equal  doctrine.s 
Nonexistence was not the only, or even quantitatively the most important 
violation of separate-but-equal. The equal clause was the law when facilities 
were provided. If southern school boards had attempted to abide by the spirit 
of the law, a defense of compensating inequalities might still have been avail- 
able (despite McCabe) because, as a practical matter, “no two facilities will 
be exactly the same, and the courts will inevitably recognize some defense 
that inequalities are reasonable” (Tushnet 1987, 25). But the point is  moot 
because the violations of  separate-but-equal were not marginal ones. Black 
people knew it, black newspapers reported it widely, published statistics were 
a~ailable.~  Why, then, was it so long before Brown? 
The question is one of the deepest, and most tragic, of  modern American 
history, and I could not pretend to answer it here. The superb histories of the 
NAACP struggle to end de jure segregation make it plain that the task was 
immense (Kluger 1977; Tushnet 1987). Society was racist, and the legal cli- 
mate was hostile. Potential plaintiffs (teachers, children and their parents) 
numbered in the millions, a huge geographic area was involved, the NAACP 
was hardly wealthy, and its staff was small. In many states the appropriate 
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state constitutions which required equal facilities in some manner (for ex- 
ample, in the length of the school year). Obtaining such writs was a costly 
and arcane process; further, they might have to be obtained year in and year 
out (”bshnet  1987, 27).  In most cases the information required to litigate 
equalization suits was enormously expensive to collect, even when the in- 
equalities were obvious. Potential plaintiffs lost their jobs or risked bodily 
harm by  participating.  If  the goal  was  readily identifiable, the means to 
achieve it were not. 
From the very beginning the core of the NAACP’s legal strategy was to link 
de jure segregation with discrimination, and get rid of the former by making 
the latter too costly to maintain. The strategy had three principal advantages 
ex ante: it was legally sound, it fit the ideology of the major NAACP partici- 
pants (if not always their clients), and it was much cheaper than bringing a 
large number of equalization suits.1° The opposition, of course, did not stand 
still. The road to Brown was strewn with losses as well as some unexpected 
victories. But the solution to the “endgame”-that  de jure  segregation im- 
posed psychological harm on black children-was  brilliant, because it made 
Brown, or a decision like it, inevitable as long as the Court was receptive to 
such evidence, which it was by the late 1940s.l1 
In its eventual acceptance of the NAACP’s arguments, the Court laid the 
basis  for  a  moral  indictment  of  separate-but-equal  in  public  education. 
Separate-but-equal was not only bad logic, bad history, bad sociology, and 
bad constitutional law, it was bad. Not because the equal part of separate-but- 
equal was poorly enforced, but because de jure  segregation was immoral. 
Separate-but-equal, the  Court ruled  in  Brown, is  inherently unequal. For 
Tushnet, the struggle to end segregated schools is important in the large for 
what it says about the history (good and bad) of America’s commitment to the 
values expressed in its Constitution, and it is important in the small for the 
blueprint it provides to public interest law and advocacy groups seeking to 
redress civil rights injustices of the past (1987). 
While I have no disagreement with this point of view, I believe there is a 
further historical basis for a moral indictment of separate-but-equal.  That ba- 
sis  is  a  fundamental counterfactual,  put  succinctly  by  Morgan  Kousser 
(1980b, 40): How much would the economic “lives of black people in Amer- 
ica” have  improved “if  the court had  enforced equal benefits even if  the 
schools were segregated[?]”  If the answer to Kousser’s query is “a great deal 
of  difference,” then the failure to enforce the equal part of the separate-but- 
equal decision was deeply immoral, too. If the answer is “little difference,” 
there is the added question of why, and possibly the implication that the equal 
part of  separate-but-equal was not enough to advance black economic prog- 
ress. 
Previous claims that the violations of  separate-but-equal affected educa- 
tional and labor market outcomes rest heavily on indirect evidence and inher- 
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with Coleman’s (1966) famous report, have shown how difficult it is to con- 
sistently document positive links between the characteristics of  schools (e.g., 
per pupil expenditures) and school achievement (e.g., test scores).13  In the 
1970s the pendulum swung so far in one direction that two leading scholars in 
the field entitled one their articles, “Do Schools Make a Difference?’ (Sum- 
mers and Wolfe 1977). 
But, no matter how uncertain the answer to that question may be today, it 
does not follow that the answer was equally uncertain in the past. By historical 
standards, the modem spatial variation in measured school characteristics is 
relatively  small,  and  ferreting  out  the  partial  effect  of  that  variation on 
achievement is a difficult statistical problem.  l4  Compensatory and mandated 
programs make the problem harder, in that per pupil expenditures may be 
highest in areas where achievement is lowest. Given these obstacles, it is not 
surprising that intangible or difficult to measure aspects of schools seem much 
more important than interdistrict variability in per pupil expenditures. Yet the 
violations of separate-but-equal were so large, as was the eventual improve- 
ment over time in the quality of black schools, that “it is hard to believe that 
differences in school effectiveness did not narrow along with the convergence 
in school resources” (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1986,72). 
Empirical plausibility, however, is no substitute for empirical evidence. It 
has been suggested that differences in  black-to-white earnings ratios across 
birth cohorts are evidence that the violations of separate-but-equal  had signif- 
icant consequences. Blacks born in recent decades were educated in higher 
quality  schools; consequently the  black-to-white earnings ratio should be 
higher initially for these cohorts, and the ratio should stay roughly constant 
throughout their working lives (Smith and Welch  1989). For the most part, 
the earnings ratios do evolve as the hypothesis predicts.I5 But the evolution of 
earnings ratios does not prove the point, because it is impossible to use aggre- 
gate data to distinguish the effects of  school quality from other factors asso- 
ciated with particular cohorts. Other tactics have been to include a dummy 
variable for southern birth or measures of school characteristics in the state of 
birth in an earnings regression, but on the whole these attempts have not been 
successful.’6 Direct  evidence  from  the  pre-Brown  era  on  the  impact  of 
separate-but-equal  has been little studied. 
The remainder of the chapter presents such evidence from three case stud- 
ies. The first uses data from the public use sample of the 1900 census to dem- 
onstrate that, had the black and white schools been “equal,” black children 
would have attended school more frequently than they actually did. The sec- 
ond uses county-level data to show that better schools would have raised black 
literacy rates. The third case study also uses county-level data to show that 
enforcement of separate-but-equal  would have improved black childrens’ per- 
formance on standardized tests. 
The lax enforcement of  the equal part of  the separate-but-equal doctrine 
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also show that, even if equality in school resources had prevailed, there would 
still have been a racial gap in school attendance, literacy, and test scores. The 
likelihood that a black child attended school, for example, was not only a 
function of  school characteristics but  also depended on aspects of  family 
background-parental  literacy, for example. Early in the postbellum period, 
many of these aspects were direct legacies of slavery, and later on, were indi- 
rect legacies. 
In his recent book,  Without Consent  or Contract:  The Rise and Fall  of 
American SZavery, Robert Fogel (1989) puts forth a moral indictment of slav- 
ery. By denying economic mobility to individuals and their children, slave- 
owners violated a basic human right. For the children freed by the Emancipa- 
tion  Proclamation, the  withholding of  literacy  (among other skills) from 
parents created an intergenerational drag on economic progress that lasted 
well into the twentieth century. By  itself, enforcement of  the separate-but- 
equal doctrine would not have been enough to loosen the chains of illiteracy 
linking one generation to the next: a compensatory doctrine-“separate-plus- 
redistribution”-would  have been necessary but, needless to say, was not pos- 
sible at the time. In this way, the moral indictment of separate-but-equal forms 
a continuum with the moral indictment of slavery. 
5.2  Separate-but-Equal  and the Racial Gap in School Attendance 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that black children in the early twentieth century 
South attended school less frequently at every age than did white children. 
Compounded over childhood, the age-specific differences in  school attend- 
ance led to significant racial differences in educational attainment. In this sec- 
tion I examine the hypothesis that the racial attendance gap was a consequence 
of  racial inequality in the provision of  school facilities (Du Bois and Dill 
1911, 137; Ransom and Sutch 1977, 28-30).  Had the equal part of  separate- 
but-equal been enforced, in other words, the racial attendance gap would have 
been smaller. 
To  investigate the hypothesis I use an econometric model of school attend- 
ance: 
The dependent variable, A, measures the frequency of school attendance by a 
child; X,,  is a set of  family background variables; X,  is various characteristics 
of the child; X,  is a set of characteristics of the public schools;  X, is geographic 
characteristics; and p’s are coefficients; and e is a random error term. 
Equation (1) can be thought of  as the outcome of  a bargaining problem 
between the parents (or head of the household) and the children, resulting in 
an allocation of  children’s time between school and other activities, such as 
work in the market or at home. The frequency of school attendance is a func- 
tion of certain characteristics of the parent and of the child; the characteristics 75  The Impact of  Separate-but-Equal 
Table 5.1  Sample Means and Standard Deviations: Southern Families in 1900 
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Mean  Standard Deviation  Mean  Standard Deviation 
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22.83  4.5  29.41  6.3 
0.28  0.16  0.20  0.15 
0.60  0.49  0.46  0.50 
0.21  0.41  0.15  0.36 
Source: Margo (1987). 
of  the local school; and the economic returns to schooling compared with 
other uses of the child’s time (which may vary with the household’s location). 
Given that most schooling during the period was at the elementary level, com- 
pleted before the child left home, a household model is appropriate.I* 
To  estimate equation (1) I required information on children and their par- 
ents. The sample I used consists of 2,020 southern children between the ages 
of 5 and 16, and was drawn from the public use sample of the 1900 census. 
Frequency of attendance, the dependent variable, is measured by the number 
of  months of school the child attended in the census year.I9  Child and family 
background variables were constructed from the information contained in the 
census sample. The family’s county of residence was reported, so for each 
family it was possible to make a link to county-level data on various school 
and geographic variables constructed from other sources. 
The average characteristics of  the sample are displayed in Table 5.1. Be- 76  Chapter Five 
cause the percent of children attending school at all was far less than 100, the 
average months attended, calculated over all children, was rather small. Black 
children attended fewer months of school than white children, and there were 
large racial differences in the characteristics of families, schools, and place of 
residence. Black parents were less literate than white parents, their occupa- 
tional status was lower, and they had less wealth, as indicated by lower rates 
of  homeownership.20  Compared with the white schools, there were fewer 
black schools, black school terms were shorter, class sizes larger, and teacher 
salaries were lower. Black children were more likely to live where cotton was 
grown and where a form of  agriculture known as the plantation system was 
practiced (U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1916), or in or close to an urban area. 
For children in the sample who did not attend school, the dependent vari- 
able equals zero. Because the frequency of  zeros is large, an econometric 
technique known as Tobit analysis is preferable to ordinary least squares (see 
Maddala 1983). The Tobit coefficients are shown in Table 5.2. 
Children’s school attendance was a positive function of the family’s eco- 
nomic status, as indicated by the occupational status of the head of household 
and by  homeownership. Consistent with the findings of  Chapter 2, literate 
parents were more likely to send their children to school. The positive effect 
of  parent’s literacy may capture variations in  economic status not fully re- 
flected by occupation and homeownership; alternatively, better-educated par- 
ents may have placed a higher value on educating their offspring. A similar 
explanation may  account for the positive effect of  mother’s age on black 
school attendance. 
As one would expect from the evidence in Chapter 2, the age of the child 
significantly affected the probability of  school attendance. It turned out that 
months attended among those in school did not vary by age; thus the positive 
coefficient of age and the negative coefficient of age squared reflects variations 
in the ages of entering and leaving school. After accounting for other factors, 
the child’s gender had no significant impact on school attendance. The pres- 
ence of a child under age 5 in black families lowered school attendance among 
older children, possibly by increasing the amount of time they were required 
to spend at home watching their younger siblings. 
The school variables-the  number of schools per 1,OOO children, the length 
of  the school year, the teacher-pupil ratio, and the average teacher salary- 
measure aspects of the quality of the public schools in the family’s county of 
residence.*l The greater the number of schools per 1,0oO children, the lower 
are the costs of getting to school, and school attendance should rise. Similarly, 
the more months schools were open, the longer a child could attend. Smaller 
class sizes meant that the classrooms were less crowded (seats were avail- 
able), and teachers could spend more time on instruction and less on disci- 
pline. Chapter 4  showed that, within race, higher salaries were associated 
with better-trained teachers. Hence, within race, the average salary is a proxy 
for the quality of instruction. Because black teachers suffered from wage dis- 77  The Impact of Separate-but-Equal 
Table 5.2  The Determinants of Months of  School Attendance: 
Southern Children in 1900 
Variable 
Black  White 
P  t-statistic  P  t-statistic 
Constant 
Head of household 
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Length of school year (in 
Teachers per 100 pupils 
Average monthly teacher 
salary (in 1900 dollars) 
Cotton/improVed acreage 
Plantation county 





Log  likelihood 
Number of observations 
-  34.50  10.15 
0.62  2.03 
1.58  3.82 
-0.01  -0.50 
0.73  1.70 
1.31  3.15 
0.04  2.14 
4.31  9.46 
-0.18  8.66 
0.12  0.32 
-  1.33  -2.97 
-0.03  -  0.34 
0.86  4.08 
0.76  2.84 
0.07  1.54 
-2.53  -1.23 
-  0.24  -0.37 
1.86  3.43 
4.17  92.48 
1,054.9 
868 
-  30.09  14.18 
0.60  7.62 
1.46  3.21 
0.03  1.63 
1.23  3.97 
1.17  2.77 
-0.02  -1.22 
3.97  12.28 
-  0.16  11.01 
0.09  0.74 
-0.17  -  0.58 
0.05  1.40 
0.28  1.46 
0.44  2.44 
0.02  0.40 
-  1.71  -  1.20 
-  0.07  -0.16 
0.75  1.52 
4.18  134.86 
1,974.0 
1,152 
Source: Margo (1987). 
crimination, however, the mean racial difference in average teacher salaries 
overstates the true difference in the quality of instruction (see below). 
The coefficients of  the school variables are expected to be positive, and as 
Table 5.2 shows, this expectation is confirmed by  seven of the eight coeffi- 
cienkZ2  Longer school terms and smaller class sizes would have encouraged 
children of both races to attend school more frequently, and these effects were 
larger among  A better-trained teaching force also would have in- 
creased black school attendance. 
The geographic variables, which also refer to the family’s county of  resi- 
dence in 1900, control for variations in the returns to schooling  compared with 
other uses of the child’s time. The share of improved acreage devoted to cot- 78  Chapter Five 
ton and whether plantation agriculture was  dominant in  the county should 
have been negatively related to school attendance. Prior to mechanization, 
child labor was especially productive in cotton agriculture; as one school su- 
perintendent from Georgia explained, “Whole families are reared without ever 
seeing the inside of a school. They are kept at work in the cotton fields” (State 
of  Georgia  1907,  1  13). Cotton cultivation was  frequently associated with 
plantation agriculture, in which tenant farmers operated small plots under the 
supervision of a single landlord. According to Charles Johnson (1934, 129) 
“literacy was not an asset in the plantation economy.” By contrast, in urban 
counties children had fewer productive employment opportunities (compared 
with cotton cultivation); additionally, nonfarm jobs that urban children might 
aspire to frequently required some schooling (see Chapter 6). 
Cotton cultivation or residence in a plantation county was negatively asso- 
ciated with school attendance, but the effects were small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant for both  races.  If, however, children between the 
ages of  17 and 20 are added to the sample, the coefficients of the cotton vari- 
able are much larger for both races, which suggests that the effects were con- 
centrated among older children. Urban children attended school significantly 
longer than rural children, and the effect was larger among blacks.24 
Table 5.3 gives the percentage of  the mean racial difference in school at- 
tendance explained by  the mean racial differences in  the independent vari- 
ables. The figures shown for school characteristics answer the question posed 
at the beginning of this section: how much smaller the racial attendance gap 
would have been if  separate-but-equal had  been enforced. Enforcement of 
separate-but-equal is defined to be equal average school characteristics. Fig- 
ures are shown assuming equalization of all school characteristics, and of all 
school characteristics except the average teacher salary. Equalizing all school 
characteristics overstates the effect of separate-but-equal because, as Chapter 
4 showed, most of  the racial difference in average teacher salaries reflected 
wage discrimination against black teachers. On the other hand, equalizing all 
school characteristics except the average teacher salary understates the impact 
of  separate-but-equal, because some of  the racial salary gap was a conse- 
quence of racial differences in the training and experience of teachers. Thus 
excluding teacher salaries from the calculation produces a lower bound on the 
effect of separate-but-equal. 
There are two ways to perform the calculations, one using the Tobit coeffi- 
cients for whites, the other using the coefficients for blacks. Both are shown, 
but I would argue that, from an historical point of view, the calculations  using 
the black coefficients are more appropriate ones.25  Any hypothetical equaliza- 
tion would have brought the characteristics in the black schools up to the level 
in the white schools, and the black coefficients show how such an equalization 
would have affected black school attendance.26 
Racial differences in school characteristics account for 40-77  percent of the 
racial attendance gap, depending on how the effect of  separate-but-equal is 
calculated. Had the equal part of separate-but-equal  been enforced, the racial 79  The Impact of  Separate-but-Equal 
Table 5.3  The Impact of Separate-But-Equal  on School Attendance 
Predicted Difference 
in Months Attended  % 
(white minus black)  Explained 
At sample means 






If literacy, occupational status, homeownership 
equalized: 
Black  0.24 
White  0.16 
Black  0.22 
White  0.44 
teacher salary: 
Black  0.56 
White  0.51 
Black  -  0.73 
White  -0.39 
If  all school characteristics equalized: 
If all school characteristics equalized excluding 
If all independent variables equalized: 














Note: Predicted dtjferences are calculated using the Tobit coefficients and the following formula 
(Maddala 1983, 159): E(m) = F(Xp/u)Xp + f(Xp/u)u, where E(m) is the predicted months 
attended; F is the standard normal cumulative distribution; andfis the standard normal density 
function. Black: calculation  performed  using  black coefficients; White: calculation performed 
using white coefficients. Equalized: black sample mean equals the white sample mean; Excluding 
teacher salary: black and white sample mean teacher salaries are not equalized in the calculation 
(see text). 
attendance gap would have been much smaller. But even if  it had been en- 
forced,  black children still would have attended less frequently than white 
children, because of racial differences in family background. Inadequate edu- 
cational opportunities were not the sole, or even quantitatively the most im- 
portant reason for the racial attendance gap. Racial differences in adult liter- 
acy,  occupational  status,  and  homeownership  account  for  74-83  percent 
of  the racial attendance gap; adult literacy, by itself, explains over half  of 
the gap.  27 
The final four rows of Table 5.3 show the predicted mean racial difference 
in months attended (white minus black) equalizing all variables in the regres- 
sion (that is, except for race). The predicted differences are negative: under 
these hypothetical circumstances, the black child would have attended more 
months of school than the white child. Thus the lower average attendance of 
black children cannot be attributed to a lack of  interest on the part of  their 80  Chapter Five 
parents; indeed exactly the opposite was true-black  parents had a deep de- 
sire to see their children educated (Anderson 1987). It follows that the long- 
term narrowing of the racial gap in school attendance rates (Chapter 2) was 
accomplished with the aid of pure “catch-up,’’ that is, the willingness of black 
parents to send their children to school despite adverse circumstances-pov- 
erty, adult illiteracy, and bad schools. 
5.3  Separate-but-Equal  and the Racial Literacy Gap in Alabama 
The vast majority of southern blacks learned to read and write in separate- 
and-unequal public schools. It is no small matter historically if the failure to 
enforce the separate-but-equal doctrine slowed the long-term decline of black 
illiteracy in the South. I examine this question by  analyzing the impact of 
separate-but-equal  on child literacy rates in Alabama from 1920 to 1940. The 
Alabama data were collected as part of a state school census. To the best of 
my knowledge, no other southern state reported similar information between 
these dates. It is unclear if the data are specific to public school students, but 
any bias is probably small, as private school enrollments for both races were 
but a fraction (no more than 5 percent) of  public school enrollments during 
the period (see Margo 1986a, 794). 
Table 5.4 documents racial differences in literacy and school characteristics 
in Alabama between 1920 and 1940. Black children in Alabama lagged be- 
hind their white counterparts in learning to read and write. In 1920 the literacy 
rate of black children (ages 7-20)  was 68 percent, compared with 88 percent 
among white children. By 1940 the black literacy rate had risen to 88 percent 
and the literacy gap had fallen to 8 percentage points. In 1920, instructional 
expenditures per pupil in the black schools equalled 29 percent of  expendi- 
tures per pupil in the white schools. For every dollar of  school capital per 
white child, black children received 34 cents. The length of the school year in 
the black schools averaged 93 days, two months less than the white average. 
A  majority  of  black  students-84  percent-attended  schools taught by  a 
single teacher, a figure 3  1 percentage points higher than that for whites. 
By  1940, conditions in the black schools had improved for the most part. 
In real terms, instructional expenditures per pupil in the black schools had 
quadrupled since 1920 and the black-white ratio of per pupil expenditures  rose 
to 0.47. The length of the black school year averaged 141 days, an increase of 
48 days over the 1920 figure. Although the proportion of black schools with 
one teacher fell over the period, the decline in one-teacher schools was pro- 
portionately greater for whites. Despite a tripling in the real value of school 
capital per black pupil between 1920 and  1940, the increase in the value of 
school capital was far greater in the white schools, and the black-to-white 
ratio of the school capital stock was smaller by a half. 
Throughout the period, black children lagged behind white children in lit- 
eracy rates, but over time the racial difference in illiteracy diminished sharply. 
Judging by the evidence in Table 5.4, the black schools were distinctly in- 81  The Impact of  Separate-but-Equal 
Table 5.4  Racial Differences in Child Literacy and Public School 
Characteristics: Alabama Counties, 1920-1940 
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Source: Margo (1986a). 
ferior to the white schools. How large was the effect of the racial inequality in 
school characteristics on the racial literacy gap? 
To  answer this question, I use an econometric model of literacy rates. The 
unit of observation is the county, the dependent variable is the proportion lit- 
erate (ages 7-20)  in the county, and the explanatory variables are county av- 
erages. The model is 
(2)  Lit  = Po + PFit + PJir + &’it  + eir 
L is the literacy rate in county i  in year f  (t  = 1920, 1930, 1940); E is a 
measure of student effort; X is a set of public school characteristics; F is a set 
of  family background variables; the p’s are regression coefficients; and e is a 
random error term. 
Equation (2) is an “educational production function” relating educational 
achievement to a set of inputs. Achievement (here the average literacy rate) 
depends on a combination of  factors: student effort, the characteristics of 
schools, and family background. Achievement will be higher if, holding X 
and F constant, the student puts in more effort. Holding E and F constant, an 
improvement in some aspect of school quality (e.g., a longer school year) will 
result in higher achievement. But achievement depends on more than student 
effort and school attributes; it depends, as in the analysis of school attendance, 
on family background. Modem studies have demonstrated conclusively that 
many factors, such as family income, the educational attainment of parents, 82  Chapter Five 
and the stability of family life, affect how well children do in school, no mat- 
ter how good the schools are (Summers and Wolfe 1977; Hanushek 1986). 
Effort is measured by the average daily attendance rate of pupils in grades 
one through six. The idea is that the literacy rate will be higher if, other things 
equal, students attend class more frequently, so the coefficient of  the attend- 
ance rate should be positive. The school characteristics are those listed in 
Table 5.4. All of these should have positive coefficients, except the proportion 
of  one-teacher schools. According to Welch  (1973, 59), “discipline would 
have consumed a significant proportion of  instructional time and energy” in 
one-teacher schools, which implies a negative coefficient for this variable. 
The family background variables are race (separate equations were esti- 
mated by race), per capita income, and the proportion of families who owned 
their home. Race-specific, county-level data on incomes are not available for 
the period and must be estimated.28 
The fact that the data are county averages creates certain problems. Use of 
county averages obscures the effects of the independent  variables within coun- 
ties. The large age span (7-20)  covered by the literacy rate means that some 
children would have been out of school, and the current value of characteris- 
tics might be only weakly correlated with conditions when they did attend (if 
they attended at all). In this case, school characteristics are measured with 
error, and thus their impact on literacy rates may be understated. Because the 
data from the different years are pooled, a final issue concerns the method of 
estimating equation (2). Two methods are available, the random effects esti- 
mator and the fixed effects estimator, and the results of both are reported in 
Table 5.5.29 
The most important school characteristics were the length of the school 
year and the amount of instructional expenditures. Both variables were eco- 
nomically and statistically significant determinants of literary rates, regardless 
of  race.  The  value  of  the  school capital  and  the  percentage  one-teacher 
schools, however, had no significant impact on literacy rates.3o  The absence 
of  a relation between the percentage one-teacher schools and literacy is sur- 
prising in light of Welch’s conjecture, but it may be that any negative effects 
of one-teacher schools were offset by a positive impact on younger children of 
mixing them with older children at higher grade levels. 
Family background variables-race,  per capita income, and homeowner- 
ship-were  important determinants of  literacy rates, independent of school 
characteristics. The per capita income and homeownership coefficients were 
positive, and were larger for blacks than for whites, again indicating (as in 
Sec. 5.2) the close link between family background and educational  outcomes 
in black families. 
The remaining step is to calculate the impact of  separate-but-equal. As in 
Section 5.2, I interpret enforcement of separate-but-equal as a counterfactual 
in which the racial gap in mean school characteristics is reduced to zero.31  I 
use the coefficients to calculate what the average white and black literacy rates 83  The Impact of Separate-but-Equal 
Table 5.5  Determinants of Literacy: Alabama Counties, 1920-1940 
~  ~~~~ 
White  Black 
Variable  RE  FE  RE  FE 
Constant 
Attendance rate 
Length of school year (in days) 
Expenditures per pupil, per day  X 
(in 1930 dollars) 
Value of school capital per pupil  X  lo-' 
(in 1930 dollars) 
Percentage one-teacher schools 
Per capita income 
Percentage own home 
Number of observations 
Mean squared error 
-0.53  -0.43 
(4.10)  (2.62) 
0.02  0.01 
(1.03)  (0.21) 
0.10  0.07 
(4.25)  (2.40) 
0.33  0.17 
(3.52)  (1.35) 
0.01  -0.03 
(0.17)  (0.55) 
0.003  0.01 
(0.16)  (0.68) 
0.02  0.04 
(1.98)  (1.32) 
0.03  -0.06 
(1.02)  (0.95) 
20 1 
0.007  0.008 
-1.29  -1.23 
(6.17)  (5.03) 
0.15  0.13 
(2.93)  (2.09) 
0.25  0.18 
(6.62)  (3.54) 
0.48  0.12 
(2.32)  (0.40) 
-0.04  -0.16 
(0.38)  (1.53) 
-0.03  0.03 
(0.74)  (0.52) 
0.05  0.03 
(2.10)  (0.40) 
0.30  0.26 
(3.05)  (0.76) 
180 
0.006  0.006 
Notes:  RE  = random effects estimates; FE  = fixed effects estimates. Absolute values of  t- 
statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Margo (1986a). 
would be under such conditions, and compare the counterfactual literacy gap 
to the actual literacy gap. Because some of the racial difference in instruc- 
tional expenditures reflected wage discrimination against black teachers, the 
effect of equalizing school terms is calculated separately. The calculations are 
shown in Table 5.6. The rows labelled White use the white coefficients and 
the rows labelled Black use the black coefficients. 
Equalization of school term lengths and instructional expenditures would 
have had a significant effect on the racial literacy gap. Using the random ef- 
fects coefficients, had the average length of the term in the black and white 
schools been the same in both years, other things equal, the racial literacy gap 
would have been smaller by 5-31  percent. Had separate-but-equal also been 
enforced with respect to instructional expenditures, the racial literacy gap 
would have been smaller in  total by  15-55  percent. The larger reductions 
occur when the black coefficients are used to perform the calculations which, 
as previously argued, is the better way to specify the counterfactual. The fixed 
effects coefficients yield a smaller impact, but also support the conclusion 
that enforcement of separate-but-equal would have narrowed the racial liter- 
acy gap. 84  Chapter Five 
Table 5.6  The Impact of Separate-But-Equal  on Literacy Rates 
~~  ~ 
% Explained of Racial Literacy Gap 
1920  1930  1940 



























































Source: Margcr (1986a, 798). 
The Alabama data suggest that racial inequality in the length of the school 
year and instructional expenditures kept the racial literacy gap higher than it 
would have been had the equal part of  separate-but-equal  been reality instead 
of myth. But, by itself, separate-but-equal was not enough: a significant por- 
tion of the remainder of the racial literacy gap can be  attributed to family 
background variables (per capita income and homeownership). Had incomes 
and wealth been equalized, the racial literacy gap would have been narrowed 
by even more than if separate-but-equal  had been enforced. 
It is likely that some of the effect of the income and wealth variables is a 
reflection of racial differences in adult literacy, which could not be included in 
the regressions due to data limitations. Illiterate parents could not substitute 
for inadequate schools and teach their children to read and write. A high rate 
of  adult illiteracy hindered the spread of literacy in the next generation of 
black children, independent of racial inequality in school resources.  32 
5.4  Separate-but-Equal  and Test Scores: Maryland Public Schools 
Strict enforcement of the equal part of separate-but-equal would have nar- 
rowed racial differences in school attendance and in literacy rates. These edu- 85  The Impact of Separate-but-Equal 
cational outcomes are important to study because, as Chapters 6 and 7 will 
demonstrate, school attendance and literacy significantly affected labor mar- 
ket outcomes for black men. The modem literature on educational achieve- 
ment, however, studies only the effect of school inputs on standardized test 
scores (see, e.g.,  Summers and Wolfe 1977). In theory, a standardized test 
measures the “output” of  the educational process. School attendance is an 
input, not an output. Literacy is an output, but quite a crude one in compari- 
son with a carefully designed standardized test. 
Peter Orazem (1987) has recently investigated the impact of separate-but- 
equal on standardized test scores. For several years between 1924 and 1938, 
Maryland’s state board of education reported county averages of test scores 
for its racially separate schools. Orazem analyzed the variation in test scores 
in the context of an econometric model of educational production similar to 
the one employed in the previous section. During this period the average test 
score in the black schools fell below the average score in the white schools, 
but the racial gap in test scores narrowed over time. Orazem also calculated 
how much higher black test scores would have been had school inputs been 
equalized between the races (that is, the effect of separate-but-equal). 
The achievement measure used in Orazem’s study is the race-specific pro- 
portion of students in the county “taking a nationally standardized test of read- 
ing skills who meet or exceed the national norm for the test” (1987,716).  The 
variable refers solely to children in the elementary schools. School character- 
istics are the length of the school year, measures of teachers’ education and 
experience, class size, the value of the school capital stock, and the proportion 
of  one-teache!  schools. The average test score was  assumed to be a linear 
function of the average daily attendance rate and the school inputs. Separate 
equations were estimated for black and white 
An advantage of the Maryland data is that, unlike the Alabama literacy 
rates, the test scores are solely for children currently in school. The relation 
between school characteristics and educational output, thus, is apt to be closer 
than in my study of Alabama. It is fortunate the test was nationally normed, 
although without access to the actual questions, it is hard to say whether any 
cultural or regional bias crept in. We  cannot be certain if  success on the test 
translated into economic success but, because the test measured reading skills 
(literacy), it must have had some bearing. A problem with Orazem’s study is 
the absence of any family background variables other than race (his equations 
are race 
Equalizing school characteristics would have narrowed the racial gap in test 
s.cores by between 24 and 57 percent, depending on whether the white or 
black coefficients are used for the calculation and whether dummy variables 
for counties are included in Orazem’s  regression^.^^ The average reduction, 
taken over all of Orazem’s regressions, is 37 percent. The average reduction 
in the literacy gap in Alabama (using the random effects figures in Table 5.6) 
is 38 percent.36  Given the differences between Orazem’s and my  study, it is 
s.ignificant that both yield similar conclusions about the impact of  separate- 86  Chapter Five 
but-equal. It is significant, too, that Orazem found that the length of  the 
school year had  a strong positive effect on test scores, consistent with my 
findings on school attendance and literacy rates. 
5.5  Conclusion 
Strict enforcement of the equal part of separate-but-equal  would have nar- 
rowed racial differences in school attendance, literacy rates, and test scores. 
In the next two chapters I shall show that education improved the labor market 
outcomes of black men in the early twentieth century South. Thus the viola- 
tions of separate-but-equal  hindered the long-term economic progress of black 
Americans. However, separate-but-equal was not  enough to fully equalize 
educational outcomes. Only a radical redistribution of school board budgets 
in favor of black children might have compensated for the family background 
effects that kept black children out of  school, slowed the spread of  literacy, 
and caused the test scores of black children to be lower than those of whites. 